Russia’s war of aggression and Asia’s great reset

Pyeongtaek, South Korea – A little over two years ago, COVID-19 became a textbook case of a strategic shock, or a black swan event — an unexpected occurrence that disrupts existing trends and makes significant changes to the trajectory of world affairs.

Now, much of the world is facing yet another strategic shock. This time, it comes in the form of an act of aggression with global implications.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to tectonic shifts in the strategic environment around the world, and Northeast Asia is no exception. It is easy to say that Russia’s wanton breach of the rules-based international order has already reshaped the political, military and economic landscape for each country in the region — but the question is, how?

To make sense of how things will change, it is important to take stock of the unique considerations for each country vis-a-vis this most recent strategic shock.

China

After years of offense, now on the defensive

Inevitably, more will come to light over whether the Chinese government had prior consultation with Russia before the invasion of Ukraine. But regardless of its level of complicity, the Xi Jinping regime nevertheless has reasons to be concerned.

In the United Nations, 141 members voted to condemn Russia’s aggression; governments have sanctioned the Putin regime as well as the people and industries that keep it in power; and major companies have pulled out of Russia entirely. Moreover, countries like Germany that were willing to allow their security expenditures and military readiness decline over time have reversed course as they recognize the threat to global stability represented by unchecked revisionist powers.

With the international community unequivocally throwing its weight behind Ukraine more than many had imagined, Beijing now finds itself in a position it does not like to be in: reaction mode.

A fundamental truth about the Chinese system of governance is that it institutionally privileges stability and predictability over flexibility and uncertainty. Russia’s war has now knocked China off-course, forcing a reevaluation of its standing in the international community.

Even before Russia’s invasion, there were no illusions that China was a willful rule-follower. The deplorable human rights situation in Xinjiang, the construction of militarized land features in the South China Sea and its attempt to change the status quo around the Senkaku Islands are but a few examples of its willingness to circumvent or outright exploit the rules. However, with the international community demonstrating greater resolve in the face of Russian action, it will invariably lead some in Beijing to consider what recourse they may face.

If China decides to provide support to Russia during its war against Ukraine, will countries respond by imposing costs against them? The U.S. government has already drawn that line and other countries seem ready to follow suit. How then does the Chinese government navigate the uncharted waters ahead? What does this all mean for China’s own revisionist prospects?

There are no immediate answers to those questions, including for decision-makers in Beijing.

Taiwan

Parallels with Ukraine, but a defining difference remains

Many have seen Russia’s war against Ukraine as analogous to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan: That is, it is a case of a nuclear power seeking to recover areas that it considers part of its inherent sovereign territory. Further, Taiwan, like Ukraine, lacks the firm alliance guarantees that could yield the right deterrent effect against that stronger nuclear power.

Taiwan will invariably be reassured that the international community has responded the way it has for Ukraine, but Taiwan lacks something that Ukraine always had: formal diplomatic support. Because of China’s “us or them” approach across the globe, Taiwan only has full diplomatic relations with 13 of 193 members of the United Nations, an organization to which it does not formally belong.

We should expect to see Taiwan leverage Russia’s war against Ukraine in its diplomatic outreach as it plays a dangerous balancing act. That balance comes with trying to build its global support base without triggering a militarized response from a Chinese government that does not want Taiwan to slip any further from its grasp.

North Korea

Validation for its nuclear ambitions

North Korea has been the slowest to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, but there are internal dynamics that are influencing its decision for when to open back up to the world. The country still remains mostly locked down owing to coronavirus, and by and large the situation in Ukraine has not altered this calculus.

However, there were two dangerous lessons reinforced for North Korea from Putin’s invasion.

The first is that a country that relinquishes the opportunity to be a nuclear power is at risk of invasion, despite guarantees to the contrary. Ukraine gave up the right to possess nuclear arms in 1994 with the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security guarantees that eventually failed.

The second lesson is that if a country has nuclear weapons, it can effectively deter others, even those which are economically and militarily superior.

For the Kim Jong Un regime, as calamitous as its nuclear program may have been diplomatically and economically, when it comes to regime survival, the events playing out in Europe only reinforce what they will perceive to be the wisdom of its choice. With this positive reinforcement in mind, the Kim regime will continue working through the menu for weapons development it published during the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea last January.

South Korea

New, untested leader takes the reins

South Korea’s influence in the global order continues to grow, but its place in leading and reinforcing the rules-based international order is yet to be determined, in part because of the change in presidential administration that is set to occur.

Two weeks into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, South Koreans went to the polls to vote for its next leader, which invariably took attention away from what was going on in Europe but demonstrated for the world the strength of the country’s hard-fought democratization. The margin of victory was razor thin — just 0.8% of votes between the winner and runner-up — but the peaceful transition of power is already well-under way.

Now, with the changes taking place in the international community, the question is how South Korea’s new president will lead the country on the global stage. Unfortunately, there is no clear indicator on how President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will perform in that capacity, as this career prosecutor will be serving as an elected leader for the very first time.

Japan

Decades of foreign policy undone

In his landmark speech to the Japanese Parliament, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksyy thanked Japan for being “the first country in Asia that began to put pressure on Russia.”

The swift response by the Fumio Kishida administration reflects unprecedented speed and resolve from the Japanese government in the face of Russian aggression.

With Kishida traveling to Brussels to participate in the short notice Group of Seven summit, Japan is truly demonstrating its willingness and ability to play a leadership role in the rules-based international order. The Japanese government had already expanded this role in peacetime scenarios with its formation and implementation of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” but what it is doing now is setting new precedent for Tokyo’s performance in response to crisis and war.

For whatever successes Japan is enjoying on the world stage, its actions have derailed its long-standing Russia policies. In response to Japanese sanctions, the Russian government announced it was ceasing negotiations on a possible peace treaty that would be the key to resolving the Northern Territories issue.

This territorial issue has been a fixture of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s platform — but in one month, Russia has undone what amounted to decades worth of diplomatic effort aimed at achieving a breakthrough.

Now, Japan will have to go back to the drawing board to rethink how to treat this regional neighbor. That point will be clarified by the end of the year when the new National Security Strategy and National Defense Program Guidelines are published.

United States

Will the “Asia pivot” take a hit?

Although the United States is not geographically part of the region, as an alliance partner with both Japan and South Korea — and with over 75,000 troops based in the region — it is impossible to separate it from regional security dynamics.

In the case of the strategic shock of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the question that will be on many minds is how many of those troops may be repositioned to Europe. Those concerned with that outcome will invariably invoke memories of the Barack Obama-era “Asia pivot” that seemed to give way to continued focus in the Middle East.

But this is not a fair comparison. For one, if the true threat is Russia, then observers should remember that Russia is also a part of Northeast Asia. Further, the U.S. government — as well as many countries around the world — are seeking to employ other instruments of national power in Europe (i.e. diplomatic, information and economic power) to prevent further escalation and compel an end to hostilities.

If anything, Russia’s aggression will only serve as a reminder of the importance of building coalitions and reinforcing the rules in all regions where any revisionist power may seek to exploit weaknesses in the international order, including Northeast Asia.

Russia

Mission creep already?

The country that initiated the strategic shock will feel the most impact from it of any in Northeast Asia.

The war effort alone has cost Russia billions and forced a shifting of forces from east to west. When adding the world’s economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on top of the already high costs of war, Russia will be enduring the consequences of its aggression for years, even if the Putin regime has been able to insulate itself enough from such problems.

For Russia, there remain more questions than answers. How much more bloodletting is Russia willing to endure before it ends its war in Ukraine? Will China provide an economic and diplomatic safety net? Will Russia have the resources to spare in trying to meddle in the international community’s response to North Korea? How might it respond to a strengthening of U.S. alliance relationships in the region if its focus continues to be on its western flank?

Some of these questions will be answered in the coming weeks, but as past strategic shocks have demonstrated, others may remain unanswered for years to come.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.